Note, that you use that same password to sign into Syncryption on multiple devices and My Eyes Only® for Mac. That means it can be different from the app access password. The password for the optional Syncryption service, is independent of the app access password. Without the password, there is no way to make the decryption key to decrypt your data. The other cool thing is that your password is used to create an encryption key for all the data on your device. The reason for this is, MEO™ is designed to function as an independent app. It also means that if you change one device’s password it will NOT change the other device's password. That means if you have two devices you can configure the access password with different passwords. The app access password is unique to each device. Those two passwords can be different and they are independent of each other. The first is the app access password and the second is for the optional Syncryption service. In this paper, we present and evaluate a graphical authentication mechanism, Tetrad, which appears to have the potential to address these specific concerns.There are two distinct access passwords in MEO™. Such a secret has an economic cost in terms of replacement, recall and revenue, all of which affect the financial return of the offending systems and services. This may not be a real concern within the con- text of secluded space but inadvertly reveals a secret within shared space. Apple iPhone and Nintendo Wii, regularly require users to use an on-screen keyboard for character input. Asterisks may obfuscate alphanumeric characters on entry but popular systems, e.g. This new reality places pressure on a password mechanism never intended for use in such a context. However, it is clearly inadequate in a world where in- creasing numbers of systems and services require people to authen- ticate in a shared space, while being actively observed. The resultsshow MixedKey outperforms the existing schemes.Īlphanumeric authentication, by means of a secret, is not only a powerful mechanism, in theory, but prevails over all its competitors in practice. ![]() We also implemented MixedKey and conducted experiments to measure the memorability and usability. Users could login our system in both public and private situations with just one password. MixedKey divides each password into characters, which connects graphic and text-based password. The login indicator in the scheme is randomly and safely generated for each login. In this paper, we propose a mixed login scheme called MixedKey which mixes graphic and traditional textual password. It's difficult for users to memorize two different kinds of passwords. However, graph-based password is totally different from text-based password. In order to resist the shoulder surfing attack, a number of authentication schemes based on graph have been proposed. Attacker can perform shoulder surfing attack to observe the password directly with naked eyes or some video record devices. Moreover, with the rapid increasing use of mobile applications, people often input passwords in public. However, rather than choose a complex text password people prefer to use a brief password so that they can remember it easily. Nowadays text-based password has been widely used in our daily life. However, the protection against shoulder-surfing comes at the price of longer time to carry out the authentication. Usability testing of the CHC scheme showed that novice users were able to enter their graphical password accurately and to remember it over time. The Convex Hull Click (CHC) scheme allows a user to prove knowledge of the graphical password safely in an insecure location because users never have to click directly on their password images. This paper reports on the design and evaluation of a game-like graphical method of authentication that is resistant to shoulder-surfing. Until recently, the only defense against shoulder-surfing has been vigilance on the part of the user. This is referred to as shoulder-surfing and is a known risk, of special concern when authenticating in public places. An attacker can capture a password by direct observation or by recording the individual’s authentication session. ![]() When users input their passwords in a public place, they may be at risk of attackers stealing their password.
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